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Executive Summary 
This report presents the findings of a survey on illegitimate economic practices in FYR 
Macedonia conducted between August and October 2015. This representative survey 
of 2,014 citizens focused on their experiences with undeclared work, envelope wages 
and the practice of ‘pulling strings’, as well as on their opinion about these types of 
non-compliant behaviour. 
According to the respondents, non-compliant practices are strongly ingrained in 
Macedonian society. Some 35% use personal connections in order to circumvent rules 
and procedures, 17.7% purchase undeclared goods and services, 6.1% work in the 
undeclared economy and 13% of employees receive envelope wages from their 
employer. However, these should all be treated as lower-bound estimates, given that 
surveys tend to under-report participation when sensitive issues are being investigated. 
Analysing involvement in undeclared work, nevertheless, the findings reveal that tax 
morale and personal views on the extent to which others participate are key 
determinants. The lower one’s tax morale (i.e., level of 'vertical trust'), the higher the 
propensity to participate in the undeclared economy (and this applies to both the 
demand and supply sides). Likewise, the higher is the perceived number engaged in 
such activity (i.e., the level of 'horizontal trust'), the more likely is a citizen to engage in 
illegitimate economic practices.  
To tackle illegitimate practices, therefore, citizens do not believe that increasing the 
penalties and risks of detection would be an effective approach. Instead, the prevalent 
opinion is that undeclared work can only be reduced by improving the social contract 
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between the authorities and citizens, and this should be done first and foremost by 
changing formal institutions. Citizens widely believe that there is a need for a change 
in the way in which enforcement agencies treat citizens, namely more collaboration and 
less coercion on the part of the inspectors, as well as the provision of equal treatment 
across all groups of citizens, and a sense of fair treatment by public and government 
institutions.  
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1. Introduction 
Across South-East Europe and more widely, there is a growing interest in 
understanding the causes and character of the economic activities by companies and 
individuals that are ‘hidden’ from the government authorities (Sauka et al., 2016; 
Williams, 2016a,b, 2017; Williams and Franic, 2016a,b; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, 
2016b,c; Williams and Schneider, 2016). This has been particularly acute since the onset 
of the economic downturn in 2009, which resulted in falls in public budget revenues 
(Andrews et al., 2011; CSD, 2011; Dekker et al., 2010; Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 
2014a,b,c, 2015a,b,c; Williams and Schneider, 2016). Large fiscal deficits have provided 
a catalyst for governments to pursue more efficient policy measures to stem tax non-
compliance (Dekker et al., 2010; Eurofound, 2013; Williams and Nadin, 2012a,b; 
Williams et al. 2013), with mutual learning between member states by the European 
Commission via the establishment of the European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work 
in May 2016 (European Commission, 2016). Moreover, the Commission has supported 
an array of research projects on this phenomenon across Europe. 
This report presents findings from one such project which has focused on three South-
East European countries where there is a high social embeddedness of non-compliant 
behaviour. The IAPP project titled ’GREY - Out of the shadows: developing capacities 
and capabilities for tackling undeclared work in Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR Macedonia’ 
aims at providing evidence-based recommendations to policy-makers in these three 
countries so as to enable illegitimate economic practices to be more efficiently tackled 
(European Commission, 2013).  
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Apart from structural causes, which are primarily reflected through inefficient state 
apparatus, weak rule of law and prevalent corruption in the public sector, the roots of 
tax evasion in these three countries can be found in pervasive unemployment 
(Bejaković, 2012; CSD, 2011; Dzhekova and Williams, 2014; Dzhekova et al., 2015; 
Eurostat, 2016b; Transparency International, 2015; Williams et al., 2014; World Bank, 
2015). According to estimates, one third of the official GDP in FYR Maceonida remains 
hidden from the authorities (Schneider et al., 2010), whilst illegitimate economic 
activities account for 27.1% and 30.2% of the GDP in Croatia and Bulgaria respectively 
(Schneider, 2016). 
To gather rigorous evidence on hidden economic activities in these countries, two 
separate questionnaire surveys were conducted in each country. The first surveyed 
individuals and their activities, while the second explored unregistered economic 
practices by companies. This report provides an insight into individual-level aspects of 
the phenomenon in FYR Macedonia by reporting the first survey, which was based on 
a representative survey of 2,014 households conducted between August and October 
20151. The main aim of this particular survey, whose detailed description is given later in 
this chapter, was to determine which demographic and socio-economic groups in FYR 
Macedonia are more likely to carry out illegitimate economic activities, as well to 
understand their rationales for doing so. In addition, the idea was to evaluate the 
attitudes of citizens towards various types of noncompliant behaviour and their 
                                                          
1 This is just one of several different reports prepared in this respect. Other reports can be found at: 
http://www.grey-project.group.shef.ac.uk/.  
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reasoning as policy-takers regarding the most effective strategies to reduce 
disobedience with labour and tax legislation.  
At the outset, it is important to state that our inquiry into hidden economic practices 
analysed two groups of activities. The first group of activities, commonly refereed to as 
‘undeclared work’, refers to “any paid activities that are lawful as regards their 
nature but not declared to the public authorities, taking into account differences in the 
regulatory system of Member States” (European Commission, 1998, p. 4). Undeclared 
work therefore includes all paid activities that are deliberately concealed in order to 
evade taxes and/or social security contributions or to circumvent labour legislation, but 
are legitimate in all other respects. As such, criminal activities (such as human 
trafficking, drug smuggling and prostitution) are not included, and neither are unpaid 
activities (e.g., self-provisioning, volunteering, unpaid community work). 
Besides undeclared work, the second group of activity analysed can be defined “the 
use of personal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply, or for 
circumventing formal procedures” (Ledeneva, 2013, p. 273). This is known under 
various names in the literature: in post-soviet countries it is denoted as ‘blat’, while 
in the Arab word it is called ‘wasta’ (Onoshchenko & Williams, 2013). In China, 
meanwhile, it is referred to as ‘guanxi’ (Eng. Connections), while in Brazil this practice 
is termed ‘jeitinho’ (Eng. Little way out). Leaving aside minor differences between 
these terms, throughout this report we will denote this phenomenon as ‘pulling 
strings’, which is the most common name for this practice in the English-spoken word. 
In the context of the report, ‘pulling strings’ denotes the practice of relying on 
personal connections (i.e., help from relatives, friends, colleagues or acquaintances) to 
  
 
 
Page | 14  
 
obtain goods and services outside formal means of conduct in different spheres of life, 
regardless of the reward/compensation that accompanies the arrangement. Thus, we 
do not distinguish between paid favours and those that do not entail monetary 
transaction, given that the primary emphasis is on understanding motivations of people 
to engage in this practice, not on the exact nature of the agreement between the 
stakeholders involved. 
In this report, therefore, and to evaluate illegitimate economic practices in FYR 
Macedonia, we commence with an elaboration on citizens’ perceptions of this 
endeavour, primarily regarding the prevalence of undeclared work, the role of pulling 
strings in everyday life, the effectiveness of repressive endeavours by the authorities 
and tolerance towards various types of misbehaviour. Chapter 3 provides an overview 
of the demand side of undeclared work in FYR Macedonia, while discussion about 
envelope wage practices in this South-East European country is given in Chapter 4. The 
insight into undeclared work is completed in Chapter 5, which reports the most 
important findings on the supply side of this phenomenon. Chapter 6 then elaborates 
on the causes and nature of pulling strings practices, both from the demand and supply 
side. The report ends with the overview of citizens’ opinions regarding the most 
effective policy strategies to combat noncompliant behaviour in FYR Macedonia.  
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2. Illegitimate economic practices from the perspective of Macedonian 
citizens 
This chapter examine the attitudes and perceptions of Macedonian citizens about 
undeclared work. Section 2.1 reports their views on the prevalence of undeclared work 
as well as the role of a deterrence policy approach. Section 2.2 examines the level of 
tolerance towards various violating behaviours, while section 2.3 analyzes the views of 
Macedonian citizens on the use of personal connections. 
2.1. Citizens’ opinions about undeclared work 
This section analyzes citizens’ opinions about undeclared work in FYR Macedonia. 
Before asking respondents about undeclared work, it was explained to each respondent 
what was meant by the term undeclared work. In this survey, undeclared work implies 
carrying out activities which avoid partly or entirely declaration of the income to the 
tax authorities, but which are otherwise legal. The first question analyzes the prevalence 
of the population involved in undeclared work: 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that 41% of populations think that between 20% and 50% of the 
active population works without declaring income or part of their income to tax or 
social security institutions. Furthermore, 14% of respondents reported that more than 
What would you estimate as the share of population in FYR Macedonia which 
works without declaring the income or part of the income to tax or social security 
institutions? 
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50% were engaged in unregistered work, while 17% of individuals estimated that the 
share of population engaging in undeclared activity was from 10 to 20%.  
On the other side, about a fifth of respondents stated that the prevalence of undeclared 
work is less than 10%. More specifically, 13% of respondents indicated that the 
prevalence was between 5 and 10%, while 7% of individuals said that the prevalence 
was less than 5%. 
Figure 1. Estimated share of population engaged in undeclared work, % of surveyed 
individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
These results suggest that citizens estimate that undeclared work is a widespread 
phenomenon in FYR Macedonia. The next question further examines the distribution 
of undeclared work in the Macedonian society: 
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less than 5% 5 to 10% 10 to 20% 20 to 50% 50% or more Refusal/ do not know
Do you personally know any people who work without declaring their income or 
part of their income to tax or social security institutions? 
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Figure 2 shows that almost 40% of the population stated that they know at least one 
person involved in undeclared work. On the other side, about 52% of respondents 
answered negatively to this question, while one in ten citizens either refused to answer 
or did not know the exact answer. 
Figure 2. The share of people who personally know any people who work on undeclared 
basis, % of surveyed individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
After the previous two questions, the citizens' opinion of the prevalence of the 
occupational structure of undeclared workers is examined: 
 
Every respondent could choose two groups of people who were most involved in 
undeclared work considering their economic status. Figure 3 shows that Macedonian 
citizens estimate that unemployed people are most involved in undeclared work. To be 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Yes No Refusal Do not know
Which TWO of the following groups are in your opinion most likely to carry out 
undeclared work in FYR Macedonia? 
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more exact, about 57% of respondents indicated that the unemployed people are most 
likely to participate in undeclared work, while 16% identified them as the second most 
frequent group to carry out undeclared activities. This means that a total of 73% of 
respondents identified unemployed people as the first or second group of people who 
most often performed undeclared activities. 
Part time employees and the self employed are the next most popular groups thought 
to be involved in undeclared work. In total, about 28% of respondents indicated these 
groups as the first or second choice. They are followed by students, pensioners and 
full-time employed persons, which are identified as one of the two most frequent 
groups carrying out undeclared activities by 17%, 13% and 12% of respondents 
respectively.  
Figure 3. Occupational structure of undeclared workers, % of surveyed individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Unemployed Part-time
employees
Self employed Students Pensioners Full-time
employees
Illegal immigrants Others Refusal/ DK
Most frequent Second most frequent
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After questions about how widespread is undeclared work in FYR Macedonia, two 
questions about the role of deterrence are asked. The first question is: 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that about 31% of Macedonian citizens stated that perceived 
detection risk is fairly high, while 23% of them estimated that the detection risk is very 
high. On the other hand, approximately 23% of respondents believed that the risk of 
being detected by the authorities is fairly small, while 17% of them estimated that the 
risk is very small. 
Figure 4. Perceived detection risk in FYR Macedonia, % of surveyed individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Very small Fairly small Fairly high Very high Refusal/ DK
People who work without declaring the income risk that tax or social security 
institutions find out and issue supplementary tax bills and perhaps fines. How 
would you describe the risk of being detected in FYR Macedonia? 
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The next question examines perceptions of the penalties if the authorities find out that 
someone is involved in undeclared work: 
 
Figure 5 reveals that about 38% of respondents expected that the sanction for 
participation in undeclared work will be normal tax or social security contributions due, 
but no fine. On the other hand, about 45% of individuals believed that there would also 
be fine in addition to paid tax or social security contributions due. On the other hand, 
about 45% of individuals believed that there would also be a fine in addition to paid 
tax or social security contributions. Only 6% of individuals expected prison as a 
punishment for engagement in undeclared work. 
Figure 5. Expected sanctions when authorities find out someone in undeclared work, % 
of surveyed individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Refusal/ DK
Other
Prison
Normal tax or social security contributions due, plus a fine
Normal tax or social security contributions due, but no fine
In your opinion, what sanction is to be expected if the authorities find out that 
someone has had an income from work of 250 Euros per month which was not 
declared to tax or social security authorities? 
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2.2. Attitudes towards undeclared economic activities in FYR Macedonia 
In order to examine citizens' views on the acceptability of undeclared work, the 
respondents were asked a range of questions about the acceptability of different types 
of undeclared work: 
1) Someone receives welfare payments without entitlement. 
2) A private person is hired by a private household for work and he\ she does not report 
the payment received in return to tax or social security institutions although it should 
be reported. 
3) A firm is hired by a private household for work and it does not report the payment 
received in return to tax or social security institutions. 
4) A firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not report its activity to tax or 
social security institutions. 
5) A firm hires a private person and all or a part of the salary paid to him\ her is not 
officially registered. 
6) Someone evades taxes by not or only partially declaring income. 
The participants were then asked to express their attitudes towards the acceptability of 
undeclared work based on a 10-point Likert scale, where higher values indicate greater 
tolerance. The exact question was structured as follows: 
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Figure 6 illustrates the differences between the acceptability of the six types of 
undeclared work. Undeclared work by a private person for a private household has the 
highest average score (3.49), which means that people are most tolerant towards this 
form of noncompliant behavior. The second most acceptable non-compliant behavior 
is partial or complete concealment of income by private persons, with an average 
tolerance of 2.73. It is followed by „undeclared work by a firm for a private household” 
and “undeclared work by a private person for a firm“, with the average amounting 
to 2.62 and 2.48, respectively.  
On the other hand, receiving welfare payments without entitlement is the least 
acceptable noncompliant behavior, with an average tolerance of 2.32. It is followed by 
undeclared work by a firm for another firm, which is the second least acceptable 
noncompliant behavior (2.34). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now I would like to know how you assess various behaviours. For each of them, 
please tell me to what extent you find it acceptable or not. Please use the 
following scale: ‘1’ means that you find it “absolutely unacceptable” and 
‘10’ means that you find it “absolutely acceptable”. 
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Figure 6. Average scores of toleration of various types of undeclared economic activities 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
In order to assess whether there is a difference between these six types of non-
compliant behaviour, Table 1 gives the matrix of bivariate correlations for each pair. 
Macedonian citizens have different criteria towards receiving welfare payments without 
entitlement compared with the remaining five types of misbehaviour. The 
accompanying correlation coefficients range from 0.33 to 0.46, which confirms that 
these associations are quite weak. Macedonian citizens also apply different criteria 
towards undeclared work by a private person for a private household compared with 
the remaining five types of misbehaviour, the associated correlation coefficients range 
from 0.33 to 0.48. On the other hand, the bivariate correlation coefficients for the 
remaining four types of undeclared work range from 0.58 to 0.74, which means that 
Macedonians apply similar criteria towards these four types of misbehaviour. 
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.2
3.4
3.6
Receiving welfare
payments without
entitlement
Undeclared work by a
private person for a
private household
Undeclared work by a firm
for a private household
Undeclared work by a firm
for another firm
Undeclared work by a
private person for a firm
Individuals evades taxes by
not or only partially
declaring income
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Table 1. Citizens’ attitudes towards various types of undeclared activities, correlation 
matrix 
 
Receiving 
welfare 
payments 
without 
entitlement 
Undeclared 
work by a 
private 
person for a 
private 
household 
Undeclared 
work by a 
firm for a 
private 
household 
Undeclared 
work by a 
firm for 
another 
firm 
Undeclared 
work by a 
private 
person for a 
firm 
Individuals 
evades 
taxes by not 
or only 
partially 
declaring 
income 
Receiving 
welfare 
payments 
without 
entitlement 
1.00 0.33 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.45 
Undeclared work 
by a private 
person for a 
private 
household 
0.33 1.00 0.48 0.35 0.42 0.41 
Undeclared work 
by a firm for a 
private 
household 
0.45 0.48 1.00 0.74 0.66 0.58 
Undeclared work 
by a firm for 
another firm 
0.46 0.35 0.74 1.00 0.72 0.60 
Undeclared work 
by a private 
person for a firm 
0.43 0.42 0.66 0.72 1.00 0.67 
Individuals 
evades taxes by 
not or only 
partially 
declaring 
income 
0.45 0.41 0.58 0.60 0.67 1.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The results from Table 2 confirm the findings obtained on the basis of Table 1, which 
illustrated that Macedonian citizens apply different criteria when assessing receiving 
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welfare payments without entitlement and, undeclared work by a private person for a 
private household. The conclusion is made on the basis of item-rest correlation 
measure which gives a correlation between a variable and the sum of the remaining 
five variables, and on the basis of average inter-item correlation when an individual 
variable is excluded. Average inter-item correlation tells us that exclusion of the first 
two variables would increase the average inter-item correlation. The values of 
Cronbach’s alpha also confirm the previous findings. In the case when all six variables 
are included the value of Cronbach’s alpha is 0.86, but omitting the first two variables 
increases this value.  
Table 2. Inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha 
 
Item-rest 
correlation 
Average inter-item 
correlation when 
the variable is 
excluded 
Cronbach’s alpha 
when variable is 
excluded 
Receiving welfare payments without 
entitlement 
0.52 0.56 0.87 
Undeclared work by a private person 
for a private household 
0.49 0.57 0.87 
Undeclared work by a firm for a private 
household 
0.76 0.48 0.82 
Undeclared work by a firm for another 
firm 
0.74 0.49 0.83 
Undeclared work by a private person 
for a firm 
0.75 0.49 0.83 
Individuals evades taxes by not or only 
partially declaring income 
0.69 0.50 0.83 
Test scale  0.52 0.86 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
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Finally, factor analysis is applied (Raykov and Marcoulides, 2008). This analysis also 
confirmed that there is more than one latent construct. Attitudes towards the last four 
statements were influenced by one single factor, while different reasoning mechanisms 
lie behind attitudes towards the first two misbehaviours. Therefore, the extracted values 
of the most dominant factor which was constructed based on the answers on the last 
four questions will be used as a tax morale index in further analyses. 
2.3. The views of Macedonian citizens on the use of personal connections 
In order to examine citizens' opinions about the importance of using personal 
connections, the following question was asked: 
 
Figure 7 illustrates that just 2% of respondents held the view that the use of personal 
connections was not important in order to get things done. Some 10% asserted that it 
is somewhat important. On the other hand, about 29% stated that the use of personal 
connections is important, while 59% beleived that it is very important. So, almost nine 
out of ten citizens think that personal connections are important or very important for 
achieving certain goals, which indicate that the use of personal connections to 
circumvent formal procedures is a very widespread illegitimate activity. 
  
In your opinion, how important are connections to achieve certain goals in FYR 
Macedonia? 
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Figure 7. The importance of personal connections to achieve certain goals, % of 
surveyed individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The next question examines citizens' attitudes towards the using personal connections 
to bypass formal procedures: 
 
As regards the views of citizens on using connections, Figure 8 reveals that the majority 
(57 per cent) were overall negative about its usage, while 27% adopted a neutral stance. 
On the other hand, just 16 per cent adopted a positive view of using connections to 
get things done.  
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What is your attitude towards having things done by pulling strings/ using 
connections? 
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Figure 8. Attitudes towards having things done by using connections, % of surveyed 
individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
So, although a large number of citizens (about 88%) think personal connections are 
important or very important in achieving personal goals, about 57% of citizens have a 
negative attitude about its usage.  
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3. The demand side of undeclared work in FYR Macedonia 
After analyzing the opinions and attitudes of respondents about undeclared work in 
FYR Macedonia, this section examines the direct involvement of respondents in 
undeclared work. More precisely, the demand side of undeclared work is examined, i.e. 
the involvement of respondents in the purchase of services and goods on the 
undeclared market. 
In section 3.1, a descriptive statistical analysis according to demographic, socio-
economic, spatial and policy characteristics is conducted. Furthermore, in section 3.2, 
we use a logit model to examine the statistical relationship between individual variables 
and the demand for undeclared goods and services. Finally, section 3.3 analyzes which 
goods and services were purchased on the undeclared market, from whom were they 
bought and why were they bought on an undeclared basis rather than on the regular 
market. 
3.1. A descriptive statistical overview of the purchase on undeclared market 
In the survey, the demand for undeclared goods and services is examined using the 
following two questions: 
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For the purpose of statistical analysis of the demand for undeclared goods and services, 
a new variable based on above two questions is constructed. This variable is 
constructed as follows: value 1 if an observed individual purchase either goods or 
services, or both; value 0 otherwise. Descriptive statistical analysis of newly constructed 
variable is presented in Table 3. 
Overall, 17.7% of respondents had purchased goods or services on the undeclared 
market, while 12.9% refused to answer this question. The findings reveals that men are 
more likely to participate in undeclared purchase than women, 21.3% compared with 
14.1%. 
When it comes to age, the oldest age group (individuals over the age of 65) was the 
least involved in buying on an informal market (11.6%). This share slightly increases as 
age decreases and is about 22.4% for individuals between 25-39 years. For the 
youngest age group between 15 and 24 years, this share again slightly falls to 18.1%. 
On the other side, there is no difference between those of Albanian and Macedonian 
ethnicity; their share in undeclared purchase is both about 18%. 
Q1) Have you in the last twelve months acquired any SERVICES of which you had 
a good reason to assume that they involved undeclared work, i.e. that the income 
was not completely reported to tax or social security institutions (e.g., because 
there was no invoice or VAT receipt or they offered you a ‘price for cash’)? 
 
Q2) And have you in the last twelve months acquired any GOODS of which you 
had a good reason to assume that they embodied undeclared work, i.e. that the 
income was no completely reported to tax or social security institutions? 
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Turning to employment status, 30.8% of self-employed persons participated in the 
undeclared economy from the demand side, while employed and unemployed persons 
are less likely to do so, 20.9% and 18.4% respectively. About 12% of students, inactive 
and retired persons participated in the purchase of goods and services in the informal 
market.  
Looking at the variable which describes their financial situation, it can be seen that 
participation in the purchase of goods and services does not depend on the financial 
situation within the family. Namely, the share of participation in undeclared purchase 
for all categories of financial status ranges between 16.6% and 18.1%, which is a very 
small range. The largest share in the undeclared economy had respondents who 
declared their financial status as "struggling" or "maintaining", 17.9% and 18.1% 
respectively, and the smallest share had those who declared their status as "just 
comfortable". 
It seems that the attitudes and opinions of the respondents about the distribution of 
undeclared work in the society have an impact on the decision of individuals to 
purchase goods and services in the undeclared economy. Thus, individuals who 
estimate that the share of the population involved in undeclared work is less than 5% 
have lower involvement in purchasing goods on the undeclared market (10.4%), while 
24.4% of individuals who estimate that more than a half of the population are involved 
in undeclared work participated in undeclared purchase.  
It also seems that geographic position plays a significant role in participation in 
undeclared purchases. The largest share of undeclared purchases are among citizens 
living in the Southeastern region, about 26%, followed by those living in the Pelagoni 
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and Southwestern region, around 24 and 23%, in turn. The smallest share (5.6%) is 
among citizens living in the Northeastern region. Turning to the type of locality, the 
largest share in undeclared purchase is among people who live in a rural area or village 
(20.3%), while the smallest share is among those who live in large cities (15%). 
Table 3. Undeclared demand for goods and services, % of surveyed individuals 
  
Yes No 
Refusal/ 
do not know 
Gender 
 Male 21.3 66.0 12.8 
 Female 14.1 72.9 13.1 
Age groups 
 15-24 18.1 65.7 16.2 
 25-39 22.4 67.1 10.5 
 40-54 17.7 68.3 14.0 
 55-64 14.2 73.8 12.0 
 65+ 11.6 75.6 12.7 
Nationality    
 Macedoni 17.5 70.8 11.7 
 Albanian 18.1 65.3 16.5 
Employment status 
 Employed 20.9 67.7 11.4 
 Self-employed 30.8 56.5 12.8 
 Unemployed 18.4 72.4 9.1 
 Retired 12.0 74.7 13.3 
 Student and inactive 11.9 67.2 20.9 
Financial situation 
 Struggling 17.9 69.6 12.6 
 Maintaining 18.1 71.1 10.8 
 Just comfortable 16.6 71.0 12.4 
 No money problems 17.5 67.9 14.7 
Estimated share 
 less than 5% 10.4 79.3 10.4 
 5 to 10% 11.3 75.5 13.2 
 10 to 20% 16.1 68.1 15.8 
 20 to 50% 21.2 68.0 10.8 
 50% or more 24.4 63.0 12.7 
Type of locality 
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 Rural area or village 20.3 65.7 14.0 
 Small or middle sized town 18.4 71.0 10.7 
 Large town 15.0 72.5 12.4 
Region    
 Vardar 13.3 80.4 6.3 
 Eastern 13.9 69.5 16.6 
 Southwestern 23.0 64.5 12.5 
 Southeastern 26.2 71.7 2.1 
 Pelagoni 24.0 68.6 7.5 
 Polog 21.2 63.9 14.9 
 Northeastern 5.6 65.0 29.3 
 Skopje 14.6 72.3 13.1 
Detection risk 
 Very small 23.7 67.2 9.1 
 Fairly small 20.3 62.7 17.0 
 Fairly high 16.2 72.4 11.5 
 Very high 16.4 76.6 7.2 
Expected sanctions  
 
Normal tax or social security contributions due, but 
no fine 
18.1 72.6 9.3 
 
Normal tax or social security contributions due, plus 
a fine 
18.9 71.1 10.1 
 Prison 15.3 65.2 19.5 
Tax morale 
 <2 17.1 69.8 13.1 
 2 do 4 16.4 70.7 12. 9 
 4 do 6 17.7 69.7 12.7 
 6 do 8 28.5 61.1 10.4 
 8 do 10 28.6 56.4 15.0 
Total 17.7 69.4 12.9 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
Examining the association between undeclared purchases and the perceptions of the 
risk of detection, individuals who estimate that the risk of detection is very small or 
fairly small most often participate in purchase on the undeclared market, 23.7% and 
20.3%, respectively. On the other side, about 16% of individuals who estimate that the 
risk of detection is fairly high or very high participate in undeclared purchases. Expected 
  
 
 
Page | 34  
 
sanctions for participation in undeclared work have a quite limited influence on 
purchasing goods or services on the undeclared market. Thus, between 18% and 19% 
of individuals who expect that the punishment for undeclared work will be "normal tax 
or social security contributions due, but no fine“ or “normal tax or social security 
contributions due plus a fine” participate in undeclared purchases, while the share of 
those who expect prison as a punishment is around 15%. 
Tax morale plays a significant role in people's decision to participate in undeclared 
purchases. So individuals whose tax morale is lower (those who have higher values of 
the tax morale index) participate much more in undeclared purchases. Some 28.5% of 
respondents whose tax morale index ranges between 6 and 10 participate in 
undeclared purchases, while the share of those participating in undeclared purchases 
falls to about 17% if their tax morale index is lower than 6. 
3.2. Determinants of the undeclared demand for goods and services in FYR Macedonia 
After performing the descriptive statistical analysis in the last section, this section 
establishes the existence of a statistical association between the purchase of 
undeclared goods or services and demographic, socio-economic, geographic and 
policy characteristics. To evaluate whether a statistically significant association exists, a 
logit regression analysis is here conducted. The data contained faulty answers (i.e. 
refusal and ‘don’t know’), but these missing values are estimated by applying 
multiple imputation technique (Royston, 2004; Rubin, 1987; Schafer and Graham, 2002). 
For each missing answer, 25 imputations were simulated using a system of chained 
equations.  
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Table 4 reports the results of a logit regression analysis. A sequential model building 
strategy was applied (i.e., variables were added one at a time). Model 1 only contains 
socio-demographic variables, and in each of the following models, socio-economic, 
spatial and policy variables are added, in turn. In that way we can see if the signs and 
significance changes as we add in other groups of variables. Model 4 includes all 
available variables, and as such it is the most interesting for the analysis. 
Table 4. Determinants of undeclared demand for goods and services, logit model 
 Model 1 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 2 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 3 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 4 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Female -0.480 (0.124)*** -0.377 (0.127)*** -0.381 (0.128)*** -0.376 (0.128)*** 
Age -0.014 (0.004)*** -0.019 (0.005)*** -0.018 (0.005)*** -0.017 (0.005)*** 
Nationality (RC: Macedoni)     
      Albanian -0.068 (0.152)  0.007 (0.165) -0.067 (0.189) -0.120 (0.19) 
Employment status (RC: 
Unemployed) 
    
      Employed   0.201 (0.171)  0.308 (0.178)*  0.287 (0.177) 
      Self-employed   0.735 (0.266)***  0.670 (0.275)**  0.676 (0.277)** 
      Retired   0.143 (0.248)  0.256 (0.254)  0.230 (0.255) 
      Student and inactive  -0.437 (0.236)* -0.359 (0.236) -0.365 (0.235) 
Financial situation (RC: 
Struggling) 
    
      Maintaining  -0.062 (0.16) -0.100 (0.163) -0.101 (0.164) 
      Just comfortable  -0.155 (0.179) -0.167 (0.183) -0.133 (0.183) 
      No money problems   0.007 (0.474)  0.057 (0.478)  0.129 (0.484) 
Estimated share (RC: 50% or 
more) 
    
     less than 5%  -1.041 (0.315)*** -0.935 (0.330)*** -0.870 (0.332)*** 
     5 to 10%  -0.933 (0.255)*** -0.875 (0.263)*** -0.864 (0.265)*** 
     10 to 20%  -0.489 (0.212)** -0.406 (0.219)* -0.425 (0.225)* 
     20 to 50%  -0.224 (0.169) -0.191 (0.174) -0.205 (0.176) 
Type of locality (RC: Rural area 
or village) 
    
     Small or middle sized town     0.138 (0.246)  0.112 (0.251) 
     Large town    -0.332 (0.151)** -0.343 (0.151)** 
Region (RC: Vardar)     
    Eastern    0.278 (0.355)  0.230 (0.367) 
    Southwestern    0.677 (0.346)**  0.656 (0.359)* 
    Southeastern    0.631 (0.333)*  0.584 (0.346)* 
    Pelagoni    0.898 (0.343)***  0.919 (0.353)*** 
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    Polog    0.633 (0.344)*  0.560 (0.349) 
    Northeastern   -0.432 (0.481) -0.425 (0.482) 
    Skopje    0.482 (0.317)  0.446 (0.327) 
Detection risk (RC: Very small)     
     Fairly small     0.105 (0.196) 
     Fairly high    -0.213 (0.199) 
     Very high    -0.193 (0.213) 
Expected sanctions (RC: Normal 
tax or social security 
contributions due, but no fine) 
    
 Normal tax or social security 
contributions due, plus a fine 
   
 0.014 (0.144) 
 Prison    -0.021 (0.308) 
Tax morale     0.053 (0.032)* 
Const -0.543 (0.191)*** -0.051 (0.301) -0.504 (0.422) -0.542 (0.484) 
Number of observations 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Number of imputations 25 25 25 25 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.047 0.064 0.069 
Area under ROC 0.603 0.655 0.681 0.684 
Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
Table 4 reports that gender and age have a significant impact on the decision to 
participate in the purchase of goods and services from the undeclared economy. 
Younger individuals are significantly more likely to participate in undeclared purchases 
than older age groups and men are more likely to buy undeclared than women. The 
applied logit model confirms the results of a descriptive analysis which shows that 
nationality does not have a significant impact on the demand for undeclared goods 
and services. 
Turning to employment status, the analysis confirms that only self-employed people 
are more likely to acquire goods and services on an undeclared basis than other people. 
Between employed, unemployed, retired, student and inactive people, there is no 
difference in the demand for undeclared goods and services. As for the self-assessed 
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financial situation, it is shown that difficulties in the financial situation does not have a 
significant impact on the demand for undeclared goods and services. Furthermore, 
individuals who perceive less than 20 per cent of the population to be engaged in 
undeclared work are significantly less likely to participate in undeclared purchase than 
groups believing that high proportions of the population are engaged in the informal 
economy. 
Turning to spatial characteristics, the findings on the type of locality illustrates that 
people living in large town are more likely to participate in purchase on an informal 
market than those who live in other areas. Furthermore, people living in the Pelagoni, 
Southwestern and Southeastern Region are more likely to participate in purchase on 
an informal market than those living in other regions. 
Turning to policy approaches, the findings reveal that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between undeclared purchases and either the risk of detection or the level 
of penalties. Thus, it does not confirm that the existence of a high risk of detection for 
participation in the undeclared economy and the existence of high penalties (e.g. 
imprisonment) leads to a reduction in demand for undeclared goods and services. On 
the other side, tax morale is a significant predictor of the propensity to purchase on 
the undeclared market. The higher the tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of 
purchasing undeclared goods and services.  
To further portray the effects of these explanatory variables on the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared purchases, Figure 9 outlines the predicted probabilities 
based on model 4 of a ‘representative’ citizen engaging in undeclared purchases, 
according to their gender and level of tax morale. This ‘representative’ consumer is 
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defined using the mean and modal values of the remaining predictors. That is to say, 
the representative citizen is an employed Macedoni aged 47 who is maintaining a 
comfortable financial situation and living in a large town, in the Skopje region, who 
perceives the probability of being detected by the authorities as fairly high and expects 
to pay taxes and social security contributions due plus a fine if caught. This reveals that 
the predicted probability of participation in purchasing goods and services on 
undeclared basis increases as tax morale worsens. The predicted probability for 
individuals with the highest tax morale index amounts to 19% and 14% for men and 
women respectively. For men with the lowest tax morale index, the predicted 
probability is about 28%, while for women this probability is around 22%. 
Figure 9. Predicted probability of participation in the purchase of undeclared goods 
and services of a ‘representative’ Macedonian citizen: by tax morale and gender 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
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3.3. A deeper overview of the characteristics of consumers buying on the undeclared 
market 
For every individual who admitted the purchase of undeclared goods and services, an 
anlysis can be conducted of which products such individuals bought on an undeclared 
basis and from whom did they most often buy such undeclared goods and services. 
Furthermore, the reasons for purchasing on an undeclared basis will be also analyzed. 
To find out which goods and services are most often purchased on the undeclared 
market, the following question was used: 
 
Respondents could choose more than one good or service they purchase with the 
offered list, but if they did not buy any, they couldalso respond with “other goods and 
services“. Figure 10 illustrates that on the undeclared market in FYR Macedonia, the 
most common undeclread purchase was food (e.g. farm produce) that was bought by 
about one third of respondents who admitted participation in the undeclared market. 
This means that the agriculture sector is most involved in activities in the undeclared 
market. This is followed by car repairs and house repairs / renovations which was used 
by about one fifth of the respondents. Among other services used on the undeclared 
market, we can allocate hairdressing or beauty treatments, IT assistance and cleaning 
home services which was used by 14, 11 and 10.5% of respondents, in turn.  
Which of the following goods or services have you paid for during the last 12 
months, where you had good reason to believe that they involved undeclared 
work (i.e., the income was not completely reported to the tax authorities)? 
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Figure 10. Goods and services purchased on the informal market, % of respondents 
buying on informal market 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
After deciding about purchased goods and services on the undeclared market, 
respondents who did so were asked: 
 
According to Figure 11, 37% of respondents in FYR Macedonia purchased goods and 
services on an undeclared basis from self-employed people who are not close social 
relations. Furthermore, about 13.5% of respondents purchased undeclared goods and 
services from firms and businesses. Regarding unregistered purchases by close 
individuals, the most frequent is to purchase from friends, colleagues and 
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Buying food (e.g., farm produce)
Car repairs
House repairs/renovation
Hairdresser and/or beauty treatments
IT assistance
Cleaning home
Gardening
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Tutoring
Help moving house
Elderly care
Ironing clothes
Other goods or services
Do not know
Among the following, could you please indicate from whom did you buy this good 
or service? 
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acquaintances (about 29%), while the purchase from relatives and neighbors admitted 
about 8% and 5% in turn.  
Figure 11. Suppliers of undeclared goods and services in FYR Macedonia, % of 
respondents buying on undeclared market 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
In order to get an insight into the reasons and motives for buying goods and services 
on an informal market, the following question was asked:  
 
As before, this question refers to the most important goods or services that were 
purchased undeclared. Respondents could also choose more than one answer from the 
offered list.  
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Other private persons or households
Friends, colleagues or acquaintances
Firms or businesses
Relatives
Neighbours
Other
Refusal/ DK
From the following, what made you buy it undeclared instead of buying it on the 
regular market? 
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Figure 12 shows that the most important reason for purchasing on an undeclared basis 
was the lower price. This was stated by 57% of respondents. Turning to formal economy 
failures, about 16% of the respondents reported faster services as a reason for their 
purchase on undeclared market, while about 13% of the respondents as a reason stated 
a better quality on informal market. Furthermore, about 5.5% of respondents bought 
on undeclared market because of lack of availability on regular market. 
As far as social motives are concerned for buying on undeclared market, 14% of 
respondents bought on an informal market to help someone who is need of money, 
while 13% of respondents stated that it was a favor amongst friends, relatives or 
colleagues.  
Figure 12. Reasons for buying goods or services on informal basis, % of respondents 
buying on informal market 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
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A further question then examined whether undeclared purchases were substitutuing 
for goods and services in the declared economy. The question was asked:  
 
Figure 13 shows that 45% of purchasers of goods and services on the informal market 
would decide to buy on a regular market if required good or service had only been 
available on the regular market, which points to the problem of large supply of goods 
and services on the informal market in FYR Macedonia. Additionally, about 17% of 
respondents would postpone the purchase of required goods and services, while 14.5% 
would decide do it yourself. About 11.5% of respondents would postpone the purchase 
of the required goods or services, if they could not buy it on a formal market. 
Figure 13. Action taken if the good/service was only available on the regular market, % 
of respondents buying on informal market 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia  
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From the following, what would you have done if this good or service had only 
been available on the regular market? 
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4. Under-reported wages in FYR Macedonia 
Under-reported (envelope) wages refer to the illegitimate wage practice where 
employees receive from their employers an undeclared (envelope) wage in addition to 
their formal salary (Williams, 2014d; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b,c, 2016, 2017; 
Williams et al., 2015a,b, 2016). So this is the practice in which the employer pays the 
salary in two parts. The first part is reported to the state tax authorities, while the second 
part of the salary is paid undeclared without being notified to the state tax authorities. 
For the purpose of research on “envelope wages“, only full or part time employed 
individuals are observed. In section 4.1, a descriptive statistical analysis according to 
demographic, socio-economic, spatial and policy characteristics is conducted. Then, 
using logit regression analysis, it is examined which individual characteristics affect the 
probability of receiving under-reported wages. Finally, section 4.3 analyzes more 
thoroughly some characteristics of such type of employment 
4.1. Structure of the population receiving under-reported wages – a descriptive 
overview 
In order to examine the prevalence and structure of the population receiving under-
reported wages in FYR Macedonia, the following question was asked: 
 
Sometimes employers prefer to pay all or part of the regular salary or the 
remuneration for extra work or overtime hours cash-in-hand and without 
declaring it to tax or social security authorities. Did your employer pay you all or 
part of your income in the last 12 months this way? 
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To the above question answered 643 individuals who declared himself as formally 
employed. In total, 13.1% of respondents admitted receiving under-reported wages, 
81.4% of respondents stated that they did not receive any additional undeclared 
amounts on formal wage, while 5.4% of them either refused to answer, or did not know. 
As for gender differences, male employees are far more likely to receive under-reported 
wages than female employees, 15.1% compared with 10.1%. It is also noticeable that 
the proportion of employees receiving an under-reported wage declines with age, and 
that a greater proportion of Albanian ethnicity employees are likely to receive envelope 
wages. Wage under-reporting is also heavily concentrated among those who are part-
time employed on their formal contracts. The prevalence of wage under-reporting, 
moreover, significantly varies across sectors, being most frequent in the construction 
sector, followed by agriculture, and hotels, restaurants and cafes. As for the financial 
situation, envelope wages are the most prevalent for people who stated they have no 
financial problems, but they were paid in the envelopes mostly for overtime/extra work 
conducted. On the other side, among those struggling financially, wage under-
reporting is less common but more often paid for their regular employment rather than 
overtime. The prevalence of wage under-reporting is the largest for employees 
estimating that more than 50% of the population works without declaring the income 
or part of the income to tax or social security institutions (about 17%), while it is the 
smallest for those who estimate that this share is less than 5%. As for the place of 
residence, envelope wages are the most prevalent in rural areas or villages (17.2%), 
followed by large towns (12.4%), Skopje (10.3%) and small or middle sized towns (8.7%).  
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Table 5. Distribution of under-reported wages in FYR Macedonia, % of surveyed 
dependent employees 
  
Yes No 
Refusal/ 
do not know 
Gender 
 Male 15.1 79.1 5.8 
 Female 10.1 84.9 5.0 
Age groups 
 15-24 20.1 73.6 6.3 
 25-39 16.5 80.1 3.4 
 40-54 10.1 83.0 6.9 
 55-64 6.9 86.1 7.0 
 65+ 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Nationality    
 Macedoni 10.9 84.7 4.5 
 Albanian 21.8 69.1 9.2 
Employment status 
 Full-time employed 11.9 82.4 5.7 
 Part-time employed 25.9 71.3 2.9 
Sectors of activity    
 Construction 27.6 66.3 6.1 
 Industry 11.2 87.1 1.7 
 Household services (incl. gardening, child and elderly care) 11.7 88.3 0.0 
 Transport 15.0 80.1 4.8 
 Personal services 3.2 92.3 4.5 
 Retail 12.0 83.0 5.1 
 Repair services 3.9 91.3 4.9 
 Hotel, restaurant, cafes 22.3 73.1 4.6 
 Agriculture 22.5 77.5 0.0 
 Other 9.8 86.3 3.9 
Financial situation 
 Struggling 16.1 77.0 6.9 
 Maintaining 13.9 82.5 3.5 
 Just comfortable 9.3 85.2 5.5 
 No money problems 22.0 73.2 4.8 
Estimated share 
 less than 5% 2.8 94.7 2.5 
 5 to 10% 12.1 82.7 5.3 
 10 to 20% 15.1 75.1 9.8 
 20 to 50% 13.9 82.1 4.0 
 50% or more 16.6 80.1 3.3 
Type of locality 
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 Rural area or village 17.2 79.5 3.3 
 Small or middle sized town 8.7 91.3 0.0 
 Large town 12.4 76.2 11.4 
 Skopje 10.3 86.6 3.0 
Detection risk 
 Very small 13.7 85.4 0.9 
 Fairly small 16.2 78.3 5.6 
 Fairly high 12.5 81.8 5.6 
 Very high 11.9 83.8 4.2 
Expected sanctions  
 Normal tax or social security contributions due, but no fine 14.0 82.3 3.8 
 Normal tax or social security contributions due, plus a fine 11.4 84.3 4.3 
 Prison 20.2 76.4 3.4 
Tax morale 
 <2 8.9 86.5 4.7 
 2 do 4 18.9 73.4 7.7 
 4 do 6 19.1 77.2 3.7 
 6 do 8 19.0 68.2 12.9 
 8 do 10 39.7 60.3 0.0 
Total 13.1 81.4 5.4 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
Turning to the policy measures, no noticeable association seems to exist between 
detection risk and wage under-reporting. A similar lack of association is noticeable 
regarding the expected sanctions. However, there does appear to be an association 
between tax morale and the propensity to receive under-reported wages. While only 
8.9% of employees expressing the highest tax morale stated that they received under-
reported wages from their formal employer, this share gradually increases up to 39.7% 
for employees with very low tax morale.  
4.2. Determinants of wage under-reporting in FYR Macedoina 
To evaluate whether a statistically significant association between wage under-
reporting and certain demographic, socio-economic, spatial and political variables 
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exists, logit regression analysis is conducted. As in the previous section, multiple 
imputation was used to predict missing values and inconclusive answers (i.e., refusal 
and ‘don’t know’). This is done using a system of chained equations for each 
variable with missing values, with twenty five imputations simulated for each missing 
value. As in the previous section, a sequential model building strategy was applied (i.e., 
variables were added one at a time).  
Table 6 reports the results of a logit regression analysis. The analysis shows that gender 
is not significantly associated with wage under-reporting. Although this might seem 
surprising at first glance due to the descriptive findings, there is a plausible explanation. 
A sequential model building strategy was applied, which allowed the effect of each 
individual predictor to be monitored after adding subsequent covariates. Gender was 
significant until sector was included in the model. Once introduced, the significance of 
gender disappeared. This is largely because the majority of construction workers in the 
survey were men, while women dominate in other sectors, such as retailing and the 
service sector. Indeed, although there was a moderate correlation between gender and 
sector, it was inside required limits and therefore both predictors were retained in the 
model. As the results display, firms from sectors in which women are the majority 
workforce are less likely to under-report wages. More precisely, the findings are that 
workers in the construction industry are significantly more likely to under-report wages 
than workers in all other sectors, and this is significantly the case with regard to 
manufacturing industry, personal services, the retail sector and other services. On the 
other hand, no statistically significant differences in propensity to under-report wages 
was found between individuals working in agriculture and construction workers, and 
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the same applies for workers in household services, hotels, restaurants and cafes, and 
transport. It also reveals that younger individuals are significantly more likely to receive 
under-reported wages than older age groups. No statistically significant differences 
were found however, by whether a person was full- or part-time employed. Neither was 
any strong statistically significant likelihood of participation identified according to 
their financial situation, or by whether they inhabited a rural or urban area. 
Table 6. Logit regressions of the propensity to receive under-reported wages 
 Model 1 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 2 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 3 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 4 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Female -0.446 (0.261)* -0.183 (0.293) -0.181 (0.294) -0.230 (0.303) 
Age -0.031 (0.010)*** -0.037 (0.012)*** -0.036 (0.012)*** -0.038 (0.012)*** 
Nationality (RC: Macedoni)     
 Albanian  0.705 (0.273)***  0.735 (0.315)**  0.732 (0.352)**  0.484 (0.365) 
Employment status (RC: Full-time 
employed) 
    
 Part-time employed   0.594 (0.405)  0.612 (0.408)  0.554 (0.413) 
Sectors of activity (RC: Construction)     
 Industry  -1.143 (0.464)** -1.197 (0.485)** -1.125 (0.493)** 
 
Household services (incl. gardening, 
child and elderly care) 
 -1.070 (1.190) -1.047 (1.191) -1.022 (1.278) 
 Transport  -0.799 (0.555) -0.813 (0.555) -0.822 (0.560) 
 Personal services  -2.892 (1.202)** -2.888 (1.198)** -2.932 (1.217)** 
 Retail  -1.326 (0.621)** -1.405 (0.617)** -1.474 (0.638)** 
 Repair services  -2.478 (1.234)** -2.437 (1.235)** -2.308 (1.210)* 
 Hotel, restaurant, cafes  -0.756 (0.591) -0.747 (0.596) -0.646 (0.592) 
 Agriculture  -0.492 (0.907) -0.447 (0.903) -0.655 (0.915) 
 Other  -1.412 (0.451)*** -1.424 (0.456)*** -1.421 (0.459)*** 
Financial situation (RC: Struggling)     
 Maintaining  -0.367 (0.337) -0.365 (0.342) -0.386 (0.353) 
 Just comfortable  -0.625 (0.369)* -0.677 (0.384)* -0.729 (0.391)* 
 No money problems   0.318 (0.661)  0.259 (0.678)  0.123 (0.684) 
Estimated share (RC: 50% or more)     
 less than 5%  -2.517 (1.232)** -2.528 (1.308)* -2.306 (1.286)* 
 5 to 10%  -0.228 (0.487) -0.200 (0.493) -0.058 (0.510) 
 10 to 20%   0.046 (0.451)  0.064 (0.459)  0.100 (0.477) 
 20 to 50%  -0.147 (0.382) -0.144 (0.386) -0.018 (0.395) 
Type of locality (RC: Rural area or 
village) 
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 Small or middle sized town    -0.210 (0.555) -0.282 (0.561) 
 Large town    0.244 (0.358)  0.289 (0.368) 
 Skopje   -0.062 (0.412) -0.083 (0.412) 
Detection risk (RC: Very small)     
 Fairly small     0.458 (0.418) 
 Fairly high     0.114 (0.415) 
 Very high     0.200 (0.455) 
Expected sanctions (RC: Normal tax 
or social security contributions due, 
but no fine) 
    
 
Normal tax or social security 
contributions due, plus a fine 
   -0.082 (0.282) 
 Prison     0.514 (0.582) 
Tax morale     0.150 (0.059)** 
Const -0.633 (0.448)  1.026 (0.789)  0.984 (0.821)  0.434 (0.903) 
Number of observations 643 643 643 643 
Number of imputations 25 25 25 25 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.129 0.133 0.151 
Area under ROC 0.674 0.751 0.753 0.765 
Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
As for policy measures, the analysis reveals that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between wage under-reporting and either the risk of detection or the level 
of penalties. However, tax morale is a significant predictor of the propensity to receive 
under-reported wages. The higher the tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of 
receiving under-reported wages. Individuals of Albanian ethnicity are significantly more 
likely to receive under-reported wages than those of Macedoni ethnicity. However, 
nationality was significant until tax morale was included in the model. This is largely 
because the majority of individuals of Albanian ethnicity in the survey had lower tax 
morale index. Here also exists a moderate correlation between nationality and tax 
morale, but it was inside required limits and therefore both predictors were retained in 
the model.  
  
 
 
Page | 51  
 
To further portray the effects of these explanatory variables on the prevalence of wage 
under-reporting, Figure 14 outlines the predicted probabilities based on model 4 of a 
‘representative’ employee engaging in wage under-reporting, according to their age 
and level of tax morale. This ‘representative’ worker is defined using mean and 
modal values of the remaining six predictors. That is to say, the representative citizen 
is a Macedoni male in full-time employment working in manufacturing industry who is 
maintaining a comfortable financial situation and living in a village, who perceives the 
probability of being detected by the authorities as fairly high and expects to pay taxes 
and social security contributions due plus a fine if caught. For simplicity, only the figures 
for representative workers aged 24, 35, 50 and 62 are shown. This reveals that the 
probability of receiving under-reported wages ranges from slightly above zero to 
almost 40 per cent, depending on the age and level of tax morale of the representative 
employee. For instance, while only four out of 100 workers who are 62 years old and 
with the highest tax morale (and with all other characteristics as defined above) are 
expected to receive under-reported wages, it increases to 13 out of 100 for those who 
find tax evasion absolutely acceptable. For employees aged 24, three in 20 expressing 
zero-tolerance towards tax evasion are expected to receive under-reported wages, but 
this rises to some 38 out of 100 for those with a completely permissive attitude towards 
disobedience with tax legislation. 
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Figure 14. Predicted probability of receiving under-reported wages for a 
‘representative’ Macedonian citizen: by tax morale and age 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
4.3. A deeper insight into the characteristics of quasi-formal employment in FYR 
Macedonia 
This section will provide a deeper insight into the characteristics of quasi-formal 
employment in FYR Macedonia. Every quasi-formal worker was asked a set of additional 
questions. The following question was firstly asked: 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Tax morale
age=24 age=35
age=50 age=62
Under-reported wages
Was this income part of the remuneration for your regular work, was it payment 
for overtime hours or was it both? 
  
 
 
Page | 53  
 
Figure 15 reveals that 44% of quasi-formal workers received under-reported wage for 
their regular work, while in 33% of cases they receive under-reported wage for 
overtime/extra work conducted. In about 19% of cases under-reported wage was paid 
for both their regular and over time work, while in 4% of cases the answer was “refusal 
or do not know”. Therefore, in 63% of cases, employers paid the envelope wage for 
regular work, which represents one successful tax evasion strategy. 
Figure 15. The purpose of under-reported wages, % of quasi-formal workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
In order to find out who are the envelope wages initiators, the next question was asked: 
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As Figure 16 reveals, 50 per cent of quasi-formal workers asserted that under-reporting 
their wages was suggested by their employer. On the other side, 19% of quasi-formal 
workers stated that it was a joint idea and 18% that they as an employee had suggested 
this arrangement. In 37% of all cases, therefore, the employee had an active role in 
deciding to under-report their wages, contrary to the widespread assumption in the 
literature that this is always employer-instigated (e.g., Sedlenieks, 2003; Williams, 2007; 
Woolfson, 2007). 
Figure 16. The initiators of under-reporting wages, % of quasi-formal workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The attitudes of quasi-formal workers about receiving envelope wages have been 
examined with the following question: 
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As Figure 17 displays, the outcome is that 33% of quasi-formal workers were happy 
with this arrangement of under-reporting their wage (which was particularly the case 
among those who had suggested this arrangement), 18% neutral, and just 42% would 
prefer their wage to be fully declared. Some 7% either refused to answer, or did not 
know. 
Figure 17. The level of agreement with receiving under-reported wages, % of quasi-
formal workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The next question examines whether there is a hidden agreement between the 
employee and the employer: 
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Were you happy getting part of your salary without having it declared to the tax 
or social security authorities or would you have preferred to have had your total 
gross salary declared? 
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The results summarised in Figure 18 reveals that additional conditions prevailed in 34% 
of all reported cases of wage under-reporting. Some 20% of quasi-formal workers 
receiving an additional undeclared (envelope) wage had verbally agreed to work longer 
hours, 13% had agreed not to take their full statutory holiday entitlements, and 10% 
had agreed to conduct tasks, or take on responsibilities, not stated in their written 
contract.  
Figure 18. An overview of extra conditions that accompanied under-declaration of 
wages, % of quasi-formal workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The next question relates to the amount paid as an envelope wage: 
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Did you verbally agree with your employer to any of the following conditions in 
return for receiving this additional cash-in-hand payment? 
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As Figure 19 illustrates, about 30% of quasi-formal workers indicated that up to 20% of 
their net monthly income was paid in cash as envelope wage. Furthermore, 12% of 
quasi-formal workers stated that between 21 and 40% of their take-home pay was 
given in cash as envelope wages, while 10% of them admitted that this amount was 
between 41 and 50% of their net monthly income. 
On the other hand, it is showed that in 13% of cases more than 50% of the net monthly 
income was paid in an illegal way. Even 35% of respondents refused to answer this 
question or did not know the answer. 
Figure 19. The percentage share of net monthly income paid as envelope wage, % of 
quasi-formal workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
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The next question relates to the relationship between under-reported wages and 
officially declared minimum gross wage. 
 
As Figure 20 displays, about 41% of quasi-formal workers received a declared wage 
which is higher than the minimum gross wage defined by law, while 32% of them 
recognised that their declared wage was exactly equal to the gross minimum wage in 
FYR Macedonia. A further 14% of quasi-formal workers stated that the amount of their 
declared wage was below the official minimum gross wage, while 13% of quasi-formal 
workers either refused to answer, or did not know.  
Figure 20. The relationship between under-reported wages and officially declared 
minimun gross wage, % of quasi-formal workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia  
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5. The supply side of undeclared work in FYR Macedonia 
Reflecting the consensus in the literature, undeclared work here refers to paid work 
which is legal in all respects other than it is not declared to the authorities for tax, social 
security or labour law purposes (Aliyev, 2015; European Commission, 2007; Hodosi, 
2015; OECD, 2012; Williams, 2014a). Firstly, respondents were asked whether they had 
been conducting any paid activity without reporting income to the authorities. If so, 
they were then asked a set of supplementary questions which will provide insight into 
certain characteristics of undeclared workers. 
The structure of this section is the same as in the previous two sections. A descriptive 
statistical analysis according to demographic, socio-economic, spatial and political 
variables is firstly conducted. Subsequently, to determine which of these variables has 
a significant impact on the decision to engage in undeclared work, a logit regression 
analysis is here conducted. Finally, section 5.3 analyzes goods and services provided on 
an informal market, as well as benefits from conducting these activities and motives for 
undeclared work. 
5.1. A descriptive statistical overview of undeclared work 
To assess workers involvement in the undeclared economy in FYR Macedonia, the 
following question was asked: 
 
Did you yourself carry out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months? 
Here we mean again activities which you were paid for which were not or not 
fully reported to the tax authorities? 
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Table 7 reports that 6.1% of the surveyed individuals admitted participation in 
undeclared work in the last 12 months, while 5.5% of them responded that they did not 
know the answer to that question or refused to give an answer. Finally, 88.4% of the 
individuals denied participation in undeclared work.  
The findings reveal that men are more likely to participate in undeclared work than 
women, 8.1% compared with 4.1%. It is also the case that those aged 25-39 are more 
likely to engage in undeclared work (9.4%) and that the proportion participating then 
decreases as age increases. Similarly, those of Albanian ethnicity are far more likely to 
participate in undeclared work than Macedoni, 10.6% compared with 4.5%. Turning to 
employment status, 14.4% of the self-employed engage in undeclared work and 8.6% 
of the unemployed. Other groups such as employees, the retired and students are less 
likely to do so. There is also a slight tendency for those struggling to cope financially 
to be more likely to participate in undeclared work. Those who perceive the rest of the 
population to be more likely to engage in undeclared work are themselves more likely 
to do so, reflecting that where ‘horizontal trust’ is low (i.e., trust in other citizens to 
operate legitimately), undeclared work is more likely. Undeclared work also appears to 
be more prevalent in rural areas and villages than in more urban areas, and much more 
prevalent in some regions, i.e., the Southwestern (12.4%) and Polog regions (12.0%), 
than the rest of the country. 
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Table 7. Participation in undeclared work in FYR Macedonia, % of surveyed individuals 
  
Yes No 
Refusal/ do 
not know 
Total 6.1 88.4 5.5 
Gender    
 Male 8.1 85.9 6.0 
 Female 4.1 90.9 5.0 
Age    
 15-24 5.1 87.8 7.0 
 25-39 9.4 84.8 5.9 
 40-54 5.8 88.6 5.6 
 55-64 5.1 92.5 2.5 
 65+ 2.5 91.6 5.9 
Nationality    
 Macedoni 4.5 91.8 3.7 
 Albanian 10.6 78.7 10.8 
Employment status 
 Employed 5.6 89.6 4.8 
 Self-employed 14.4 80.7 4.9 
 Unemployed 8.6 86.8 4.6 
 Retired 2.4 91.6 5.9 
 Student and inactive 4.8 87.3 7.9 
Financial situation    
 Struggling 5.6 89.6 4.7 
 Maintaining 6.7 90.0 3.4 
 Just comfortable 4.9 90.0 5.1 
 No money problems 4.4 86.5 9.1 
Estimated share    
 less than 5% 4.4 93.0 2.7 
 5 to 10% 2.5 93.4 4.2 
 10 to 20% 5.0 90.8 4.3 
 20 to 50% 7.2 87.2 5.6 
 50% or more 11.4 81.7 7.0 
Type of locality    
 Rural area or village 7.5 86.5 6.0 
 Small or middle sized town 5.3 93.7 1.0 
 Large town 5.0 89.0 6.0 
Region    
 Vardar 3.9 96.1 0.0 
 Eastern 2.7 92.7 4.6 
 Southwestern 12.4 82.3 5.3 
  
 
 
Page | 62  
 
 Southeastern 3.0 97.0 0.0 
 Pelagoni 4.5 95.1 0.4 
 Polog 12.0 80.4 7.6 
 Northeastern 0.8 80.5 18.7 
 Skopje 5.5 88.8 5.7 
Detection risk    
 Very small 7.8 90.2 2.0 
 Fairly small 5.8 88.3 5.9 
 Fairly high 7.5 87.4 5.2 
 Very high 4.8 92.1 3.1 
Expected sanctions     
 Normal tax or social security contributions due, but no fine 7.7 89.5 2.8 
 Normal tax or social security contributions due, plus a fine 5.1 90.1 4.8 
 Prison 6.9 89.0 4.0 
Tax morale    
 <2 4.1 90.8 5.1 
 2 do 4 8.4 84.8 6.8 
 4 do 6 10.1 84.5 5.4 
 6 do 8 9.4 86.0 4.7 
 8 do 10 15.3 76.4 8.3 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
Examining the association of participation in undeclared work with the perceptions of 
the risk of detection, no discreible trend appears to be apparent and so far as sanctions 
are concerned, there appears to be a slightly greater likelihood that those who perceive 
the sanctions as lower are more likely to engage in undeclared work. There does, 
however, appear to be clear relationship between participation in undeclared work and 
tax morale. The higher is the level of tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of 
participating in undeclared work. 
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5.2. Determinants of participation in undeclared work in FYR Macedonia 
To evaluate whether there is a statistically significant association between participation 
in undeclared work and certain demographic, socio-economic, spatial and political 
characteristics, a logit regression analysis is here conducted. As in the previous chapter, 
multiple imputation was used to predict missing values and inconclusive answers (i.e., 
refusal and ‘don’t know’). This is done using a system of chained equations for 
each variable with missing values, with twenty five imputations simulated for each 
missing value. As in sections 3.2 and 4.2, a sequential model building strategy was 
applied. In model 1, the socio-demographic variables are analysed, in model 2 socio-
economic characteristics are added, in model 3 spatial variables are further added 
before model 4 adds the variables evaluating the policy approaches, namely the 
perceived penalties and detection risks, and tax morale.  
Table 8 reports the results of a logit regression analysis. The finding in model 1 is that 
gender is strongly statistically significant; men are significantly more likely than women 
to participate in undeclared work. So too is ethnicity statistically significant with those 
of Albanian ethnicity more likely than Macedoni to participate in undeclared work. Age, 
however, is not found to be associated with participation in undeclared work. When 
socio-economic variables are added in model 2, the signs and significances of these 
socio-demographic variables remain the same. The additional finding is that the 
unemployed are significantly more likely to participate in undeclared work than the 
employed, retired, and students and economically inactive. So too are those who 
perceive more than 50 per cent of the population to be engaged in undeclared work 
significantly more likely to participate in undeclared work than groups believing that 
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small proportions of the population engaged in the undeclared economy. ‘Horizontal 
trust’, therefore, appears to play a significant role in determining participation in 
undeclared work. There is no statistically significant relationship, however, between 
participation in undeclared work and their financial situation. 
Table 8. Logit regression analysis of the likelihood of participation in undeclared work 
in FYR Macedonia 
 Model 1 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 2 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 3 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 4 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Female -0.711 (0.202)*** -0.658 (0.215)*** -0.668 (0.216)*** -0.692 (0.217)*** 
Age -0.009 (0.005) -0.006 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.004 (0.008) 
Nationality (RC: Macedoni)     
      Albanian  0.883 (0.207)***  0.896 (0.220)***  0.418 (0.280)  0.250 (0.283) 
Employment status (RC: 
Unemployed) 
    
      Employed  -0.511 (0.267)* -0.545 (0.277)** -0.527 (0.276)* 
      Self-employed   0.353 (0.354)  0.430 (0.380)  0.415 (0.384) 
      Retired  -0.943 (0.427)** -0.984 (0.432)** -0.996 (0.435)** 
      Student and inactive  -0.837 (0.325)*** -0.738 (0.323)** -0.690 (0.326)** 
Financial situation (RC: 
Struggling) 
    
      Maintaining   0.127 (0.251)  0.073 (0.256)  0.113 (0.259) 
      Just comfortable  -0.102 (0.305) -0.162 (0.304) -0.021 (0.311) 
      No money problems  -0.378 (0.826) -0.168 (0.865) -0.221 (0.931) 
Estimated share (RC: 50% or 
more) 
 
   
     less than 5%  -0.906 (0.473)* -0.906 (0.486)* -0.863 (0.499)* 
     5 to 10%  -1.493 (0.444)*** -1.531 (0.450)*** -1.539 (0.454)*** 
     10 to 20%  -0.639 (0.328)* -0.535 (0.342) -0.572 (0.345)* 
     20 to 50%  -0.373 (0.245) -0.357 (0.246) -0.409 (0.250) 
Type of locality (RC: Rural area 
or village) 
    
     Small or middle sized town     0.508 (0.425)  0.454 (0.450) 
     Large town    -0.015 (0.244)  0.020 (0.246) 
Region (RC: Vardar)     
    Eastern   -0.264 (0.670) -0.313 (0.710) 
    Southwestern    1.032 (0.543)*  1.065 (0.582)* 
    Southeastern   -0.589 (0.657) -0.670 (0.674) 
    Pelagoni    0.152 (0.609)  0.169 (0.664) 
    Polog    0.950 (0.580)  0.854 (0.617) 
    Northeastern   -1.354 (1.096) -1.430 (1.112) 
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    Skopje    0.629 (0.542)  0.503 (0.583) 
Detection risk (RC: Very small)     
     Fairly small    -0.202 (0.315) 
     Fairly high     0.135 (0.298) 
     Very high    -0.454 (0.337) 
Expected sanctions (RC: Normal 
tax or social security 
contributions due, but no fine) 
  
  
 Normal tax or social security 
contributions due, plus a fine 
  
 -0.365 (0.228) 
 Prison     0.011 (0.399) 
Tax morale     0.122 (0.047)*** 
Const -2.286 (0.304)*** -1.573 (0.463)*** -1.958 (0.682)*** -1.984 (0.769)*** 
Number of observations 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Number of imputations 25 25 25 25 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.089 0.116 0.133 
Area under ROC 0.681 0.728 0.756 0.765 
Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
When the spatial variables are added in model 3, the signs and significances remain 
the same for the socio-demographic and socio-economic variables, with the exception 
of ethnicity. Once spatial variables are introduced, the significance of ethnicity 
disappears, largely because of the spatial concentration of these ethnic groups. Indeed, 
although there was a moderate correlation between ethnicity and the spatial variables, 
they were inside required limits and therefore both predictors were retained in the 
model. Interestingly, however, there are no statistically significant correlations between 
participation in undeclared work and urban/rural or regional location.  
In model 4, the same socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial signs and 
significances persist as in model 3. However, the important finding is that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between participation in undeclared work and either 
the level of penalties or the risk of detection. However, tax morale is a strong significant 
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predictor of the propensity to participate in undeclared work. The higher the tax 
morale, the lower is the likelihood of participation in undeclared work.  
To further portray the effects of these explanatory variables on the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work, Figure 21 outlines the predicted probabilities based 
on model 4 of a ‘representative’ citizen engaging in undeclared work, according to 
their gender and level of tax morale. This ‘representative’ worker is defined using 
mean and modal values of the remaining predictors. That is to say, the representative 
citizen is an employed Macedoni aged 47 who is maintaining a comfortable financial 
situation and living in a large town, in the Skopje region, who perceives the probability 
of being detected by the authorities as fairly high and expects to pay taxes and social 
security contributions due plus a fine if caught. This reveals that the probability of the 
representative man engaging in undeclared work is higher than for a woman at all 
levels of tax morale, and that as tax morale worsens, the probability of participating in 
undeclared work increases for both men and women. For men, for example, the 
probability of engaging in undeclared work ranges from seven in a 100 for those with 
the highest tax morale to 18 in a 100 for those with the lowest tax morale, and for 
women from four in a 100 to 10 in a 100 respectively.  
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Figure 21. Predicted probability of participation in undeclared work of a 
‘representative’ Macedonian citizen: by tax morale and gender 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
5.3. A deeper insight into the labour supply side of undeclared work in FYR Macedonia 
In order to examine in detail the characteristics of undeclared work in FYR Macedonia, 
undeclared workers were asked several supplementary questions. Firstly, we analyze 
activities which suppliers have carried out undeclared in the last 12 months. The 
question was as follows: 
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A list of activities was offered to assist respondents in answering the question, but each 
individual could add an activities that was not on the list. Additionally, multiple answers 
were possible.  
Figure 22 illustrates that 13% of undeclared workers had provided home maintenance 
and improvement services, 10% baby-sitting, 8% had worked as a waiter or waitress, 
8% had sold other goods or services, 7% had engaged in domestic cleaning, 6% IT 
assistance, 6% tutoring, 6% had sold food produce, 4% car repairs, 3% gardening 
services, 3% had sold goods or services associated with their hobby, 3% had undertaken 
home removal, and 2% ironing clothes. 
Which of the following activities have you carried out undeclared in the last 12 
months? 
  
 
 
Page | 69  
 
Figure 22. Type of activities carried out on an undeclared basis, % of undeclared 
workers 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
After this question, every individual was instructed to focus on the most important 
activity they conducted on an undeclared basis. The next question analyzes for whom 
unregistered workers most often sell goods or services: 
 
Figure 23 reveals that only 17 per cent of this undeclared work was conducted as waged 
employment for businesses. The remaining 83 per cent was conducted on a self-
employed basis, with 21 per cent conducted for friends, colleagues or acquaintances, 
18 per cent for relatives, 11 per cent for neighbours, and the remaining 26 per cent on 
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Among the following, would you please indicate for whom did you carry out this 
activity? 
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a self-employed basis for people previously unknown to them. Some 7 per cent either 
refused to answer, or did not know. The important finding, therefore, is that one half 
of all undeclared work in FYR Macedonia is conducted for close social relations. This is 
a similar proportion to the finding in previous studies in the EU28 as a whole (Williams, 
2014a).  
Figure 23. The structure of the buyers of undeclared goods and services in FYR 
Macedonia, % of undeclared workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
Macedonia 
To further explore the key factors behind undeclared work in FYR Macedonia, every 
undeclared worker was asked about their reasons for participating in undeclared work: 
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Among the following, what were the reasons for doing this activity undeclared? 
  
 
 
Page | 71  
 
Respondents could choose more than one response from the list. Furthermore, they 
could also offer their new reason. Figure 24 illustrates that even 34% of respondents 
could not find a regular job, 12% of them stated that the person(s) who acquired an 
activity insisted on the non-declaration and 6% admitted that working undeclared is 
common practice in their region\ sector of activity so there is no real alternative. For 
the above three reasons it can be concluded that undeclared workers did not have a 
real alternative, i.e. they are not involved in informal actions with their will. 
On the other side, the remaining reasons can be characterized as voluntary choice. 
About 19% of informal workers stated that it is just seasonal work and so it is not worth 
to declare it, 18% that both parties benefited from it, 14% that the State does not do 
anything for you, so why pay taxes, 8% that taxes and\ or social security contributions 
are too high, 7% that they were able to ask for a higher fee for their work and 3% that 
bureaucracy\ red tape to carry out a regular economic activity is too complicated. As 
for social reasons, 12% of undeclared workers stated that they did undeclared activity 
in order to help someone out and 10% that this is the normal way how this is done 
among friends, neighbours or relatives. 
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Figure 24. Motives for participating in undeclared work, % of undeclared workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The next question examines the frequency of the most important activity which was 
carried out on an undeclared basis: 
 
As Figure 25 reveals, 63% of undeclared workers admitted that they carried out this 
activity a few times during the year and 24% with certain regularity. Only 10% of them 
stated that they condacted the activity just once. 
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Thinking about the most significant undeclared work you just mentioned, did you 
carry out this activity only once or a few times or do you carry it out with certain 
regularity? 
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Figure 25. Frequency of the most important undeclared activity, % of undeclared 
workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The next question relates to the received financial compensation for carrying out the 
most important undeclared activity: 
 
As Figure 26 shows, about 28% of informal workers earnd less than EUR 3 per hour for 
the most important undeclared activity, 18% of them got between EUR 3 and EUR 5 
per hour. Some 13% of undeclared workers received between EUR 6 and EUR 10, while 
for 4% of them their income was above EUR 10 per hour. Even 36% of undeclared 
workers either refused to answer, or did not know the answer. 
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Figure 26. Price per hour (in EUR) for the most important undeclared activity, % of 
undeclared workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The last question analyzes the total income that was received form undeclared work: 
 
Figure 27 reveals that approximately one third of informal workers admitted to having 
earned below EUR 100 from undeclared work during the previous 12 months, while 
about a quarter of respondents received between EUR 101 and EUR 500. Some 11% 
earnd between EUR 501 and 1000 and 6% earned more than EUR 1000. A quarter of 
undeclared workers either refused to answer, or did not know the answer. 
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Figure 27. Total net income (EUR) from undeclared work in the last 12 months, % of 
undeclared workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia  
0
5
10
15
20
25
less than 20 20-50 51-100 101-200 201-500 501-1000 more than 1000 Refusal/DK
  
 
 
Page | 76  
 
6. Personal conections and their role in circumventing formal 
procedures in FYR Macedonia 
Receiving and providing personal favours in order to circumvent formal procedures 
prevails in all countries and regions of the world to varying degrees. In this chapter, the 
aim is to evaluate the extent to which personal connections are used to circumvent 
formal procedures, and who engages in such practices in FYR Macedonia. 
6.1. The use of personal connections to get things done 
To examine the use of personal connections in circumventing formal procedures, each 
individual was asked to state whether he/she used personal connections to achieve 
personal goals in 13 different spheres of life. Respondents could add any other 
situations in which they used personal connections to get things done. The following 
question was asked first: 
 
In total, 35% of all respondents admitted the use of personal connections to get things 
done in at least one of offered spheres. Table 9 reports that 18.2 per cent of all 
participants surveyed had used personal connections to gain access to medical services 
(e.g., jumping the queue, getting a better examination), 9.3 per cent to find a job, 8 per 
cent to get repairs (e.g., to their home or car), 7 per cent to solve problems with the 
law enforcement authorities such as the traffic police or customs, 6.8 per cent to speed 
Have you in the last twelve months asked anyone for a favour/help using 
connections? 
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up bureaucratic procedures with the public administration, and 6.5 per cent to gain 
access to everyday services such as hairdressers and bank services.  
When it is recognised that not all respondents needed to obtain these services in the 
past 12 months (e.g., medical services, finding a job, solving problems with the law 
enforcement authorities), personal connections appears to be commonly used to get 
things done. Although we do not know whether respondents had engaged with these 
realms in the past, it can be tentatively concluded that personal connections seems to 
be very commonly used when gaining access to medical services, finding a job, dealing 
with legal services and the courts, and accessing education, which are activities that 
only a relatively small proportion would have accessed in the year prior to the survey, 
and less commonly used when acquiring foodstuffs and consumer goods, which are 
activities that most would have engaged in during the year prior to the survey. 
Table 9. The use of personal connections to get things done in FYR Macedonia: by 
sphere, % of surveyed respondents 
Sphere Yes No Refusal /DK 
Medical services: skipping queue, getting better examination, 
surgery 
18.2 77.4 4.5 
Finding a job 9.3 86.3 4.4 
Repairs (housing, garages, car) 8.0 88.7 3.3 
Solving problems with the law enforcing authorities: traffic police, 
customs 
7.0 88.1 4.9 
Speeding up bureaucratic procedures (e.g. at the municipal hall) 6.8 89.8 3.4 
Everyday services at better quality or better price (bank services, 
hairdressers…) 
6.5 89.7 3.9 
Legal services and courts 4.5 91.3 4.2 
Education: places in higher education/ obtaining degree/diploma 
etc. 
4.4 92.1 3.6 
Foodstuffs 4.0 92.8 3.3 
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling tickets 3.8 93.3 2.9 
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 3.5 92.8 3.7 
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Consumer goods excl. foodstuffs 2.8 94.3 2.9 
Communicating with local authorities in your business matters (e.g. 
delaying tax payment) 
2.6 94.0 3.4 
Other 1.3 98.7 0.1 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
Additionally, each individual who admitted pulling strings was asked for the reasons of 
circumvention the rules. Figure 28 reveals that 31% of such individuals stated that they 
used pesronal conections to receive services without queuing and to improve quality, 
30% to get information, and 26% to reduce the final price. One out of five individuals 
who admitted pulling strings used personal conections to circumvent the rules/ laws/ 
bureaucracy, 13% to make rules/ laws work, 11% to be introduced to useful people, 
while 10% of them used personal connections only to maintain connections. 
Figure 28. Motives for using personal connections in FYR Macedonia, % of individuals 
who admitted pulling strings 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
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To further investigate the use of personal connections the respondents who admitted 
pulling strings were asked the following question: 
 
When answering the questionnaire, a list with concrete answers was offered to 
respondents. Figure 29 displays that 64% of individuals stated that friend helped to get 
things done, while in 36% of cases a relative was asked for a favour. Neighbour 
provided favours in 13% of cases, while colleague provided in 12% of cases. One out 
of five individuals admitted that they asked other people for a favour. 
Figure 29. The persons who helped/ did a favour, % of individuals who admitted pulling 
strings 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
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Finally, every identified user of personal connections was asked the following question: 
 
Figure 30 illustrates that seven out of ten individuals said just "thank you" for the 
received favours, while 24% of respondents offered the return of favour. Material 
awards are given in 40% of cases. In 21% of cases it was a gift and in 19% of cases cash 
was given as a reward. 
Figure 30. The given compensation for the favour/ help received, % of individuals who 
admitted pulling strings 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
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6.2. The prevalence of personal connections from the supply side in FYR Macedonia 
This section analyzes the use of personal connections from the supply side. In other 
words, the prevalence and reasons of giving favours in 13 different spheres of life are 
analyzed. The next question was firstly asked: 
 
Table 10 reveals the prevalence of providing favours in each of the offered spheres of 
life. Some 8.2 per cent of participants had made arrangements for somebody they knew 
to gain access to medical services either due to their direct control over these assets or 
more usually by acting as a third party to help them establish contact with a relevant 
person. Similarly, 7.7 percent had helped somebody find a job, 5.4 per cent to gain 
access to somebody who could do repairs (e.g., car or home repairs). The reason for 
the lower supply-side figure is that participants are likely to be able to provide favours 
in a limited range of spheres (mostly the areas in which he/she works or those areas in 
which s/he knows somebody and can act as a third party in gaining access), but can 
receive favours in almost any sphere depending on the breadth of his/her connections. 
The frequency of providing favours in other spheres is less than 4%. 
Table 10. Providing favours to circumvent formal procedures in FYR Macedonia: by 
sphere, % of surveyed respondents 
Sphere Yes No Refusal /DK 
Medical services: skipping queue, getting better examination, 
surgery 
8.2 88.6 3.1 
Finding a job 7.7 88.6 3.8 
Repairs (housing, garages, car) 5.4 91.7 2.9 
Have you in the last twelve months helped anyone? Did someone a favour? 
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Everyday services at better quality or better price (bank services, 
hairdressers…) 
4.0 92.9 3.2 
Solving problems with the law enforcing authorities: traffic 
police, customs 
3.4 92.1 4.5 
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 3.1 94.1 2.8 
Foodstuffs 3.0 94.2 2.9 
Education: places in higher education/ obtaining 
degree/diploma etc. 
2.9 93.3 3.7 
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling tickets 2.9 94.5 2.6 
Speeding up bureaucratic procedures (e.g. at the municipal hall) 2.8 93.9 3.3 
Legal services and courts 2.7 93.9 3.4 
Consumer goods excl. foodstuffs 2.7 94.7 2.6 
Communicating with local authorities in your business matters 
(e.g. delaying tax payment) 
1.6 95.7 2.7 
Other 0.9 98.9 0.2 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
Additionally, each individuals who admitted doing favours were asked for the reasons 
of circumvention the rules. Figure 31 illustrates that providing information was the most 
immportant reasons for doing favours. About 35% of individuals who admitted doing 
favours stated such a reason in at least one of the occasions. Second reason for 
providing favours was improving the quality, which was reported in 29% of cases. One 
out of five individuals admitted that the reason was reduction of the final price or 
circumvention of rules/laws/bureaucracy. In 16% of cases favour was done in order to 
help people receiving services without queuing, while in 14 % cases favour was done 
just to maintain connections.  
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Figure 31. Reasons for providing favours in FYR Macedonia, % of individuals who 
admitted doing favours 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The following question analyzes who the most frequently helped people to bypass 
formal rules: 
 
Figure 32 reveals that friends were the most frequent group of people who were helped 
by providers of illegitimate assistance (56%), while relatives were mentioned at least 
once in 41% of cases. The remaining groups were mentioned much less than the 
previous two groups, neighbours were helped at least once in 13% of cases, colleagues 
in 12% and other people in 16% of cases. 
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Figure 32. The persons for whom the favours was done, % of individuals who admitted 
doing favours 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
The next question analyzes a reward/compensation which was received for the favour 
provided: 
 
Figure 33 displays that three out of four individuals who did a favour to somebody did 
not received any significant reward, e.g. they received only verbal gratitude. One out of 
five individuals who helped someone expects to receive some of the favours back. As 
for the material rewards or compensations, about 13% of providers the favours at least 
once received a cash as a reward, while 12% received a gift. 
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Figure 33. The received compensation for the favour/ help provided, % of individuals 
who admitted doing favours 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
6.3. Determinants of the use of personal connections to circumvent formal procedures 
in FYR Macedonia 
This section reveals who uses personal connections in order to get things done and 
who does favours for others. To evaluate this, a logit regression analysis is applied. 
Given that there were a large number of missing values and inconclusive answers (i.e., 
refusal and ‘don’t know’) across the dependent and independent variables, 
multiple imputation was used to predict the values. This is done using a system of 
chained equations for each variable with missing values, with 25 imputations simulated 
for each missing value. Furthermore, population weights are applied based on age and 
gender to correct for under- and over-representation in the sample.  
Table 11 reports the results of a logit regression analysis which investigates whether 
individual socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial variables are significantly 
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associated with engagement when other variables are taken into account and held 
constant. Starting with who receives favours in order to bypass formal procedures, 
model 1 examines the socio-demographic variables. This reveals that there are no 
significant gender variations in the use of personal connections. Neither are there any 
significant variations according to household size in terms of the number of adults. 
However, age does have a significant influence on its usage; younger age groups are 
more likely to use personal connections than older age groups. 
When socio-economic variables are included in model 2, the findings ragrding the 
socio-demographic variables remain the same. The additional finding is that the higher 
is the personal formal net income of a respondent, the more likely they are to use 
personal connections to get things done. Those receiving favours to bypass formal 
procedures, therefore, are significantly more likely to be the affluent rather than poor. 
So too is there a strong significant correlation between receiving help due to personal 
connections and participation in the undeclared economy. Those receiving help due to 
personal connections are significantly more likely to also purchase undeclared goods 
and services and to supply undeclared work. 
Model 3 adds in spatial variables. The finding is that signs and significances of the 
socio-demographic and socio-economic variables remain the same. The additional 
finding is that use of personal connections is also significantly higher in rural areas and 
villages than in more urban areas, and there also significant regional variations in its 
usage. Those in the Eastern, Southeastern and Pelagoni regions are less likely to do so 
than those in the Vardar region. 
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Table 11. Logit regression analysis of the use of personal connections to bypass formal 
procedures in FYR Macedonia 
 Model 1 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 2 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 3 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Female -0.163 (0.099)* -0.003 (0.103)  0.018 (0.106) 
Age -0.012 (0.003)*** -0.012 (0.003)*** -0.009 (0.004)*** 
Household size (RC: one person)    
 Two persons -0.063 (0.194) -0.093 (0.198) -0.100 (0.200) 
 Three persons  0.103 (0.205)  0.154 (0.210)  0.146 (0.213) 
 Four and more  0.013 (0.191) -0.001 (0.196) -0.026 (0.198) 
Net income for formal work (RC: Less 
than 350 EUR) 
   
 350-700 EUR   0.114 (0.139)  0.125 (0.143) 
 700-1000 EUR   0.430 (0.148)***  0.381 (0.154)** 
 More than 1000 EUR   0.474 (0.160)***  0.395 (0.169)** 
Supply undeclared work   1.140 (0.236)***  1.028 (0.241)*** 
Purchase undeclared goods and services   0.794 (0.138)***  0.911 (0.146)*** 
Type of locality (RC: Rural area or village)    
 Small or middle sized town    -0.779 (0.212)*** 
 Large town    -0.055 (0.121) 
Region (RC: Vardar)    
 Eastern   -0.561 (0.267)** 
 Southwestern    0.137 (0.244) 
 Southeastern   -0.643 (0.262)** 
 Pelagoni   -0.683 (0.258)*** 
 Polog    0.149 (0.240) 
 Northeastern    0.313 (0.291) 
 Skopje   -0.222 (0.223) 
Constant  0.120 (0.265) -0.412 (0.280) -0.260 (0.349) 
Number of observations 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Number of imputations 25 25 25 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.057 0.083 
Area under ROC 0.579 0.652 0.692 
Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
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Turning to who does favours for others, the finding in Table 12 is that very similar 
patterns are identified as when who uses personal connections to bypass formal 
procedures. The finding in model 1 is again that gender and household size are not 
significantly associated with the giving of favours but younger people are significantly 
more likely to do so than older generations. As model 2 reveals, so too are higher 
income earners significantly more likely to do favours for others, as are those who 
supply and purchase undeclared work, perhaps reflecting that those not abiding by the 
laws and regulations of the state with regard to paying taxes, social contributions and 
abiding by labour laws, is similarly the case when it comes to bypassing formal 
procedures by receiving and doing favours for personal connections. Model 3, 
moreover, reveals that similar spatial variations exist regarding who is more likely to do 
favours for others. It is again those living in rural areas and villages rather than those 
in more urban areas, and regional variations again exist. However, here it is only those 
in the Southeastern region who are less likely to provide favours to others than those 
in the Vardar region, indicating that the provision of favours to others is more evenly 
distributed regionally than the receipt of favours. 
Table 12. Logit regression analysis of the giving of personal connections to bypass 
formal procedures in FYR Macedonia 
 Model 1 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 2 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Model 3 
Coef.(S.E.) 
Female -0.184 (0.112) -0.037 (0.116) -0.037 (0.119) 
Age -0.010 (0.004)*** -0.011 (0.004)*** -0.007 (0.004)* 
Household size (RC: one person)    
 Two persons -0.075 (0.229) -0.115 (0.230) -0.151 (0.232) 
 Three persons  0.242 (0.243)  0.265 (0.242)  0.229 (0.248) 
 Four and more  0.048 (0.229)  0.020 (0.227) -0.005 (0.233) 
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Net income for formal work (RC: Less 
than 350 EUR) 
   
 350-700 EUR   0.150 (0.164)  0.144 (0.169) 
 700-1000 EUR   0.427 (0.170)**  0.366 (0.177)** 
 More than 1000 EUR   0.657 (0.174)***  0.599 (0.184)*** 
Supply undeclared work   0.839 (0.220)***  0.686 (0.230)*** 
Purchase undeclared goods and services   0.594 (0.146)***  0.655 (0.152)*** 
Type of locality (RC: Rural area or 
village) 
   
 Small or middle sized town    -0.547 (0.250)** 
 Large town    -0.163 (0.128) 
Region (RC: Vardar)    
 Eastern   -0.235 (0.295) 
 Southwestern   -0.100 (0.287) 
 Southeastern   -0.971 (0.331)*** 
 Pelagoni   -0.382 (0.302) 
 Polog    0.282 (0.272) 
 Northeastern   -0.319 (0.347) 
 Skopje    0.006 (0.263) 
Constant -0.691 (0.316)** -1.170 (0.329)*** -1.048 (0.418)** 
Number of observations 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Number of imputations 25 25 25 
Prob > F 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.045 0.063 
Area under ROC 0.572 0.644 0.677 
Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
To provide a more graphical portrait of these findings regarding who is more likely to 
receive and give favours in order to bypass formal procedures, Figure 34 present the 
predicted probabilities of a representative Macedonian citizen receiving and giving 
favours to circumvent formal procedures, according to their age and whether they 
purchase and supply undeclared work. This ‘representative’ worker is defined using 
mean and modal values of the remaining predictors. That is to say, the representative 
citizen is a woman living in a household with three persons, with a net income between 
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€350-699 per month, living in a large town and the Skopje region. This reveals that the 
probability of the representative citizen who purchases and supplies undeclared work 
is greater that they give and receive favours than for the representative citizen who 
does not purchase or supply undeclared work. For those receiving favours, for example, 
the probability of doing so ranges from 25 in a 100 for the oldest citizens who do not 
purchase undeclared goods and services to 62 in a 100 for the youngest citizens who 
also supply undeclared work. Similarly, when doing favours for others, the probability 
ranges from 18 in a 100 for the oldest citizens who do not purchase undeclared goods 
and services to 42 in a 100 for the youngest citizens who also supply undeclared work. 
Figure 34. Predicted probability of the use of personal connections for a 
representative’ Macedonian citizen: by age and participation in the undeclared 
economy 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia  
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7. Citizens’ attitudes towards various strategies for tackling illegitimate 
economic activities in FYR Macedonia 
This chapter examines citizens’ views on the effectiveness of certain measures to 
tackle illegitimate economic activities. First section (7.1) examines measures related to 
undeclared and under-declared work, while the second section (7.2) presents citizens' 
views on certain measures to suppress the use of personal connections to circumvent 
formal procedures. 
7.1. Citizens’ attitudes towards various strategies for tackling undeclared and under-
declared work 
In order to examine citizens' attitudes towards tackling undeclared and under-declared 
work, each respondent received a set of statements. Each statement represents one 
particular policy measure with its potential effect. Citizens expressed their level of 
agreement with those statements on a Likert scale, with values ranging from ‘1’ 
(strongly disagree) to ‘5’ (strongly agree), where value 3 represents neutral attitudes. 
The following question was asked: 
 
Table 13 reveals that most of the survey respondents strongly agree with the majority 
of statements. About 32% of individuals strongly agree with the statment that preople 
Now I would like to know your level of agreement with the following statements. 
For each of them please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the 
statement: ‘1’ means “strongly disagree” and ‘5’ means “strongly 
agree”. 
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would be more willing to pay taxes, if they were better informed on how government 
is spending public money. Additionally, 14% of people agree to a certain extent with 
this idea (answer 4), while 28.3% of them strongly disagree or disagree to a certain 
extent. A large number of people, 55.1% of them, strongly agree (34.0%) or agree to a 
certain extent (21.1%) with statement that ensuring a sense of fairness in how people 
are treated by the tax authorities would reduce evasion of taxes and social 
contributions. So establishing cooperation between tax administration and taxpayers 
is very important.  
Building trust between government and tax payers is also very important. About 51% 
of people strongly agree (33.7%) or agree to a certain extent (17.4%) with statement 
that people would be more willing to pay their taxes, if they had greater trust in 
government. Only 9.9% of respondents strongly disagree with the statement. 
Providing support and advice to undeclared workers who are thinking moving to formal 
work may also be a very important factor in tackling the undeclared economy. A quarter 
of the respondents strongly agree that specialised support and advice for those who 
are considering moving from undeclared to formal work would reduce undeclared 
work, while 21.6% of them agree to a certain extent with this statement. On the other 
hand, only 8.8% of respondents strongly disagree with this statement. Furthermore, 
about half of respondents strongly agree (26.2%) or agree to a certain extent (24.3%) 
that making it easier to legitimately do small or occasional jobs would reduce 
undeclared work. 
Facilitating the tax payment system is very important in counteracting tax evasion. A 
quarter of respondents agree and 20.3% of them agree to a certain extent with the 
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statement that tax evasion would be reduced if the tax authorities make it easier for 
people to pay their taxes, e.g. through providing pre-filled tax returns. Approximately, 
a quarter of respondents strongly disagree or disagree to a certain extent with this 
statement. 
A large number of people, 44.9% of them, strongly agree that more inspections are 
required at employers’ premises to tackle the problem with undeclared work. 
Additionally, one fifth of the respondents agree to a certain extent with this statement, 
while only 5.8% of them strongly disagree. On the other hand, 40.6% of people strongly 
disagree (23.3%) or disagree to a certain extent (17.3%) that increasing penalties up to 
imprisonment for people caught doing undeclared work is likely to reduce its 
prevalence, while only a fifth of people strongly agree with the statement.  
Table 13. Citizens’ attitudes towards various strategies for tackling undeclared and 
under-declared work in FYR Macedonia, % of survey respondents 
  1 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 
5 
strongly 
agree 
Refusal 
Do not 
know 
1 
If people were better informed 
on how government is 
spending public money, they 
would be more willing to pay 
taxes 
12.9 15.4 20.8 14.6 32.0 0.7 3.6 
2 
Ensuring a sense of fairness in 
how people are treated by the 
tax authorities would reduce 
evasion of taxes and social 
contributions 
7.8 12.3 19.5 21.1 34.0 1.0 4.3 
3 
If people had greater trust in 
government, they would be 
more willing to pay their taxes 
9.9 13.4 20.6 17.4 33.7 1.0 3.9 
4 
Telling consumers about the 
negative consequences of 
undeclared work (e.g., no 
11.5 15.6 24.3 18.7 21.8 1.4 6.7 
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insurance cover, no guarantees 
that health and safety 
regulations have been 
followed, no legal recourse) 
would reduce where they use it 
5 
Specialised support and advice 
for those who are considering 
moving from undeclared to 
formal work would reduce 
undeclared work 
8.8 13.2 24.0 21.6 25.0 1.4 6.2 
6 
Tax evasion would be reduced 
if the tax authorities make it 
easier for people to pay their 
taxes, e.g. through providing 
pre-filled tax returns 
9.3 16.1 22.2 20.3 25.1 1.1 6.0 
7 
Making it easier to legitimately 
do small or occasional jobs 
would reduce undeclared work 
7.9 12.0 20.9 24.3 26.2 1.3 7.5 
8 
Undeclared work would be 
reduced if people were allowed 
to deduct from the taxes they 
owe some of the costs of 
paying for household services 
(e.g., babysitting, cleaning, 
elderly care, cooking, 
gardening, tutoring) 
7.1 11.1 23.1 21.7 27.3 1.1 8.7 
9 
More inspections are required 
at employers’ premises to 
tackle the problem with 
undeclared work 
5.8 9.4 16.7 19.1 44.9 1.1 3.0 
10 
Increasing penalties up to 
imprisonment for people 
caught doing undeclared work 
is likely to reduce its 
prevalence 
23.3 17.3 18.6 14.8 20.8 1.2 4.0 
11 
If the Tax Office was 
encouraging to those who 
have difficulty meeting their 
obligations through no fault of 
their own the tax evasion 
would be reduced 
6.3 12.4 25.8 22.6 23.8 1.3 7.8 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
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In order to show the previous results in a simpler way, Figure 35 reveals average ratings 
for previous eleven statements. The statement that more inspections are required at 
employers’ premises to tackle the problem with undeclared work has the highest 
mean score of 3.9, while the strategy of increased penalties has the lowest score among 
the offered policy measures (2.9). Average support for all remaining statements ranges 
between 3.3 and 3.6.  
Figure 35. Average support towards various strategies for tackling undeclared work in 
FYR Macedonia 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
More inspections are required at employers’ premises to tackle the problem with 
undeclared work
Ensuring a sense of fairness in how people are treated by the tax authorities would
reduce evasion of taxes and social contributions
Undeclared work would be reduced if people were allowed to deduct from the taxes
they owe some of the costs of paying for household services (e.g., babysitting,
cleaning, elderly care, cooking, gardening, tutoring)
If people had greater trust in government, they would be more willing to pay their
taxes
Making it easier to legitimately do small or occasional jobs would reduce undeclared
work
If the Tax Office was encouraging to those who have difficulty meeting their
obligations through no fault of their own the tax evasion would be reduced
Specialised support and advice for those who are considering moving from
undeclared to formal work would reduce undeclared work
Tax evasion would be reduced if the tax authorities make it easier for people to pay
their taxes, e.g. through providing pre-filled tax returns
If people were better informed on how government is spending public money, they
would be more willing to pay taxes
Telling consumers about the negative consequences of undeclared work (e.g., no
insurance cover, no guarantees that health and safety regulations have been
followed, no legal recourse) would reduce where they use it
Increasing penalties up to imprisonment for people caught doing undeclared work is
likely to reduce its prevalence
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7.2. Citizens’ attitudes towards various strategies for tackling the use of personal 
connections to get things done 
In this section an identical approach will be implemented in the case of pulling strings 
to get things done. Citizens expressed their level of agreement with offered three 
statements on a Likert scale, with values ranging from ‘1’ (strongly disagree) to ‘5’ 
(strongly agree), where value 3 represents neutral attitudes. The following question was 
asked: 
 
Table 14 illustrates that most of the survey respondents strongly agree with all three 
statements. About 39% of participants strongly agree with statement that ensuring the 
sense of fair treatment in public and government institutions would reduce the use of 
connections. Additionally, 18.4 % of people agree to a certain extent with this 
statement, while only 6% strongly disagree. Therefore the fair treatment in public and 
government institutions towards citizens has an important role in reducing the reliance 
on the use of personal connections. 
It seems that complicated bureaucratic procedures are also a major incentive to use 
personal connections to circumvent formal procedures. Every third participant strongly 
agreed with the statement that complicated bureaucratic procedures are one of the 
main reasons for resorting to the use of connections. Furthermore, 16.5% of 
Now I would like to know your level of agreement with the following statements. 
For each of them please tell me to what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
statement: ‘1’ means strongly disagree and ‘5’ means strongly agree. 
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respondents agree to a certain extent with this statement, while every fifth participant 
strongly disagree (8.4%) or disagree to a certain extent (11.9%).  
Finally, lack of information on the required procedures also encourages the use of 
personal connections. More precisely, 31.6% of respondents strongly agree and 19% 
of them agree to a certain extent with the statement that people would not resort to 
the use of connections to achieve certain things, if they were better informed of the 
procedures in place. On the other hand, only 9.1% of people strongly disagree with this 
statement. 
Table 14. Citizens’ attitudes towards various strategies for tackling the use of personal 
connections to get things done in FYR Macedonia, % of survey respondents 
  1 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 
5 
strongly 
agree 
Refusal 
Do not 
know 
1 
Complicated bureaucratic 
procedures are one of the main 
reasons for resorting to the use 
of connections 
8.4 11.9 24.2 16.5 33.6 1.0 4.4 
2 
Ensuring the sense of fair 
treatment in public and 
government institutions would 
reduce the use of connections 
6.0 12.2 20.0 18.4 38.7 0.9 3.9 
3 
If people were better informed 
of the procedures in place, they 
would not resort to the use of 
connections to achieve certain 
things 
9.1 14.7 20.9 19.0 31.6 1.3 3.4 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia 
When it comes to observing the average support towards various strategies for tackling 
the use of personal connections, Figure 36 reveals that the statement that the use of 
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personal connections would be efficiently reduced ensuring the sense of fair treatment 
in public and government institutions, received the greatest average rating of 3.8. 
Simplification of bureaucratic procedures received an average rating of 3.6, while 
providing information on the required procedures has the average rating of 3.5. 
Figure 36. Average support towards various strategies for tackling the use of personal 
connections to get things done 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,014 individuals in 
FYR Macedonia  
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Ensuring the sense of fair treatment in public and government institutions would
reduce the use of connections
Complicated bureaucratic procedures are one of the main reasons for resorting to
the use of connections
If people were better informed of the procedures in place, they would not resort to
the use of connections to achieve certain things
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